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Why the Singularity Cannot Happen 
 
 
Theodore Modis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract The concept of a Singularity as described in Ray  Kurzweil’s  book 
cannot happen for a number of reasons. One reason is that all natural growth 
processes that follow exponential patterns eventually reveal themselves to be 
following S-curves thus excluding runaway situations. The remaining growth 
potential from Kurzweil’s ‘‘knee’’, which could be approximated as the moment 
when an S-curve pattern begins deviating from the corresponding exponential, is a 
factor of only one order of magnitude greater than the growth already achieved. A 
second reason is that there is already evidence of a slowdown in some important 
trends. The growth pattern of the U.S. GDP is no longer exponential. Had Ku- 
rzweil been more rigorous in his fitting procedures, he would have recognized it. 
Moore’s law and the Microsoft Windows operating systems are both approaching 
end-of-life limits. The Internet rush has also ended—for the time being—as the 
number of users stopped growing; in the western world because of saturation and 
in the underdeveloped countries because infrastructures, education, and the stan- 
dard of living there are not yet up to speed. A third reason is that society is capable 
of auto-regulating runaway trends as was the case with deadly car accidents, the 
AIDS threat, and rampant overpopulation. This control goes beyond government 
decisions and conscious intervention. Environmentalists who fought nuclear 
energy in the 1980s, may have been reacting only to nuclear energy’s excessive 
rate of growth, not nuclear energy per se, which is making a comeback now. What 
may happen instead of a Singularity is that the rate of change soon begins slowing 
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down. The exponential pattern of change witnessed up to now dictates more 
milestone events during year 2025 than witnessed throughout the entire 20th 
century! But such events are already overdue today. If, on the other hand, the 
change growth pattern has indeed been following an S-curve, then the rate of 
change is about to enter a declining trajectory; the baby boom generation will have 
witnessed more change during their lives than anyone else before or after them. 
 
 
 
Background 
 
 
In 2005 together with four other members of the editorial board of Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change I was asked to review Ray Kurzweil’s book The 
Singularity Is Near. The task dragged me back into a subject that I was familiar 
with. In fact, ten years earlier I had thought I was the first to have discovered it 
only to find out later that a whole cult with increasing number of followers was 
growing around it. I took my distance from them because at the time they sounded 
nonscientific. I published on my own adhering to a strictly scientific approach 
(Modis 2002a, 2003). But to my surprise the respected BBC television show 
HORIZON that became interested in making a program around this subject found 
even my publications ‘‘too speculative’’. In any case, for the BBC scientists the 
word singularity is reserved for mathematical functions and phenomena such as 
the big bang. 
Kurzweil’s book constitutes a most exhaustive compilation of ‘‘singularitarian’’ 
arguments and one of the most serious publications on the subject. And yet to me it 
still sounds nonscientific. Granted, the names of many renowned scientists appear 
prominently throughout the book, but they are generally quoted on some funda- 
mental truth other than the direct endorsement of the so-called singularity. For 
example, Douglas Hofstadter is quoted to have mused that ‘‘it could be simply an 
accident of fate that our brains are too weak to understand themselves.’’ Not 
exactly what Kurzweil says. Even what seems to give direct support to Kurzweil’s 
thesis, the following quote by the celebrated information theorist John von Neu- 
mann ‘‘the ever  accelerating process of  technology…gives the appearance of 
approaching some essential singularity’’ is significantly different from saying ‘‘the 
singularity is near’’. Neumann’s comment strongly hints at an illusion whereas 
Kurzweil’s presents a far-fetched forecast as a fact. 
What I want to say is that Kurzweil and the singularitarians are indulging in 
some sort of pseudo-science, which differs from real science in matters of meth- 
odology and rigor. They tend to overlook rigorous scientific practices such as 
focusing on natural laws, giving precise definitions, verifying the data meticu- 
lously, and estimating the uncertainties. 
The work I present here uses a number of science-based approaches to argue 
against the possibility that the kind of singularity described by Kurzweil in his 
book will take place during the 21st century. I will concentrate on the near future 
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because horizons of several hundred years permit and are more appropriate for 
fantasy scenarios that tend to satisfy the writer’s urge for sci-fi prose. 
 
 
 
There are No Exponentials. There are Only S-Curves 
 
Exponential Versus S-Curve 
 
 
The law describing natural growth has been put into mathematical equations called 
growth functions. The simplest mathematical growth function is the so-called 
logistic. It is derived from the law, which states that the rate of growth is pro- 
portional to both the amount of growth already accomplished and the amount of 
growth remaining to be accomplished. If either one of these quantities is small, the 
rate of growth will be small. This is the case at the beginning and at the end of the 
process. The rate is greatest in the middle, where both the growth accomplished 
and the growth remaining are sizable. This natural law described with words here 
has been cast in a differential equation (the logistic equation) the solution of which 
gives rise to an S-shaped pattern (S-curve). In Eq. (16.1) below M is the value of 
the final ceiling, t0 is the time of the midpoint and a reflects the steepness of the 
rising slope. 
 
𝑋 𝑡 =  
𝑀
1 + 𝑒−α(𝑡−𝑡𝑜 )
                                    (16.1) 
 
It is easy to see that for t large and positive the population X(t) tends to 
M.  Similarly  for  t  large  and  negative  the  expression  reduces  to  a  simple 
exponential. 
It is a remarkably simple and fundamental law. It has been used by biologists to 
describe the growth in competition of a species population, for example, the 
number of rabbits in a fenced off grass field. It has also been used in medicine to 
describe the diffusion of epidemic diseases. J. C. Fisher and R. H. Pry refer to the 
logistic function as a diffusion model and use it to quantify the spreading of new 
technologies into society (Fisher and Pry 1971). One can immediately see how 
ideas or rumors may spread according to this law. Whether it is ideas, rumors, 
technologies, or diseases, the rate of new occurrences will always be proportional 
to how many people have it and to how many don’t yet have it. 
The analogy has also been pushed to include the competitive growth of inan- 
imate populations such as the sales of a new successful product. In the early 
phases, sales go up in proportion to the number of units already sold. As the word 
spreads, each unit sold brings in more new customers. Sales grow exponentially. 
It is this early exponential growth which gives rise to the first bend of the S-curve. 
Business looks good. Growth is the same percentage every year—exponential 
growth—and hasty planners prepare their budgets that way. Growth, however, 
cannot  be  exponential.  Explosions  are  exponential.  Natural  growth  follows 
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Fig. 16.1  The construction of a theoretical S-curve (gray line) and the exponential (thin black 
line) it reduces to as time goes backward. The formulae used are shown in the graph 
 
S-curves, but all S-curves behave like exponentials early on. Kurzweil himself 
addresses this issue, which he calls ‘‘The Criticism from Malthus’’ toward the end 
of his book. He admits that the exponential patterns he publicizes will eventually 
turn into S-curves, but dismisses the fact because, as he claims, this will happen so 
far into the future—after the Singularity—that for all practical purposes it becomes 
irrelevant. (Elsewhere, Kurzweil acknowledges that there are smaller S-curves that 
saturate early, but argues that they are replaced by other small S-curves thus 
cascading indefinitely. He does not seem to be aware of the fact that there is a 
fractal aspect to such cascades and constituent S-curves are bound by envelope 
S-curves, which themselves saturate with time, see discussion in section Fractal 
Aspects of Natural Growth below.) 
Let us see whether it is possible to estimate when exponential trends can be 
expected to turn into S-curves. First let us see at what time the S-curve deviates 
from the exponential pattern in a significant way, see Fig. 16.1. Table 16.1 below 
quantifies the deviation between a logistic and the corresponding exponential 
pattern as a fraction of the S-curve’s final ceiling. By ‘‘corresponding’’ exponential 
I mean the limit of Eq. (16.1) as t → -∞. 
In Table 16.1 we appreciate the size of deviation between exponential and 
S-curve patterns as a function of how much the S-curve has proceeded to completion. 
Obviously beyond a certain point the difference becomes flagrant. When exactly this 
happens maybe subject to judgment so Table 16.1 is there to quantitatively help 
readers make up their mind. Most readers will agree that a 15 % deviation between 
exponential and S-curve patterns is significant because it makes it clear that the two 
processes can no longer be confused. This happens when the S-curve that corre- 
sponds to the exponential has reached about 13 % of its ceiling level. In other words, 
the future ceiling that caps this growth process is about 7 times today’s level. 
This moment when an exponential pattern begins deviating significantly from 
an S-curve also defines an upper limit for Kurzweil’s so called ‘‘exponential 
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Table 16.1  The deviation 
between exponential and S- 
curve patterns as a function of 
how much the S-curve has 
proceeded to completion 
 
Deviation (%) Penetration (%) 
11.1 10.0 
12.2 10.9 
13.5 11.9 
15.0 13.0 
16.5 14.2 
18.3 15.4 
20.2 16.8 
22.3 18.2 
24.7 19.8 
27.3 21.4 
30.1 23.1 
33.3 25.0 
36.8 26.9 
40.7 28.9 
44.9 31.0 
49.7 33.2 
54.9 35.4 
60.7 37.8 
67.0 40.1 
74.1 42.6 
81.9 45.0 
90.5 47.5 
100.0 50.0 
 
 
 
knee’’. Of course, exponential patterns do not have knees (this can be trivially 
demonstrated with a logarithmic plot where the exponential pattern becomes a 
straight line from t = -∞ to t = +∞). What Kurzweil sees as the moment an 
exponential ‘‘abruptly’’ rises will move toward the future (or the past) as we 
increase (or decrease) the vertical scale of a linear plot. But if we interpret Ku- 
rzweil’s knee as the moment when a growth process still following an exponential 
pattern begins having very serious impact on society—a subjective definition 
carrying large uncertainties—then there will be at least a 7-fold increase remaining 
before the process stops growing. 
It has been theoretically demonstrated that fluctuations of a chaotic nature begin 
making their appearance as we approach the ceiling of an S-curve. This is evidence 
of the intimate relationship that exists between growth and chaos (the logistic 
equation in discrete form becomes the chaos equation) (Modis 2007). In an 
intuitive way these fluctuations can be seen as the stochastic search of the system 
for equilibrium around a homeostatic level. 
But it has been argued that fluctuations of a chaotic nature may also precede the 
steep rising phase of the logistic (Modis and Debecker 1992). The intuitive 
understanding of these fluctuations is ‘‘infant’’ mortality. In all species survival is 
uncertain during the early phases of the life cycle. 
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Infant mortality and common sense can help us establish a lower limit for 
Kurzweil’s knee. Any natural growth process that has achieved less than 10 % of 
its final growth potential cannot possibly have a serious impact on society. In fact 
10 % growth is usually taken as the limit of infant mortality. A tree seedling of 
height less than 10 % of the tree’s final size is vulnerable to rabbits and other 
herbivores or simply to be stepped on by a bigger animal. 
Below we look at some real cases. They all corroborate a lower limit of the order of 
10 % below which the impact on society cannot be considered very serious. 
 
 
 
US Oil Production 
 
 
A real case is the production of oil in the United States, shown in Fig. 16.2. 
Serious oil production in the United States began in the second half of the 19th 
century. During the first one hundred years or so cumulative oil production fol- 
lowed an exponential pattern. But soon it became clear that the process followed a 
logistic growth pattern—S-curve—and rather closely, see Fig. 16.2. If we try to fit 
an exponential function to the data, we obtain a good fit—comparable in quality 
with the logistic fit—only on the range 1859–1951. As we stretch this period 
beyond 1951 the quality of the exponential fit progressively deteriorates. S-curve 
and exponential begin diverging from the 1951 onward, which corresponds to 
around 20 % penetration level of the S-curve.1 
If we were to position a ‘‘knee’’ a la Kurzweil on this exponential pattern, it 
could by some thinking be in the early 1930s time by which almost all horses had 
been replaced by cars in personal transportation maximizing the demand for oil 
(Modis 1992). At that time the penetration level of the S-curve was around 7 %. 
Consequently on this growth process, which seemed exponential for the better part 
of one hundred years, there is a ceiling waiting at about 14 times the knee’s 
production level. 
 
 
 
Moore’s Law 
 
 
The celebrated Moore’s Law is a growth process that has been evolving along an 
exponential growth pattern for four decades. The number of transistors in Intel 
microprocessors has doubled every two years since the early 1970s. But it is now 
unanimously expected that this growth pattern will eventually turn into an S-curve 
and reach a ceiling. On page 63 of his book Kurzweil claims that Moore’s law is 
one of the many technological exponential trends whose knee we are approaching. 
 
 
1  The fitted exponential here is not quite the same as the exponential that the S-curve tends to as 
t → ∞. 
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Fig. 16.2 S-curve and exponential fit on yearly data points. The circle indicates a possible 
position for the ‘‘knee’’ of the exponential; it lies at the 7 % penetration level of the S-curve. Data 
Source U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
 
But he also agrees that Moore’s law will reach the end of its S-curve before 2020. 
Moore himself agrees, ‘‘no physical thing can continue to change exponentially 
forever,’’ he says and positions an end for this phenomenon around 2015. But he 
still expects three more generations (we should mention that in 1995 Moore had 
consistently expected 5 more generations.) 
It must be pointed out—particularly for those who claim that every time people 
thought a limit was reached in the past new ways were found to cram more 
transistors together—that in the very first formulation of Moore’s law in 1965 the 
doubling was every year. David House, an Intel executive, raised it to 18 months, 
and later in 1975 Moore himself raised it to two years. These successive adjust- 
ments may not constitute proof but the fact that we are dealing with an eventual 
S-curve cannot be disputed. Given that we are dealing with an S-curve, the slowing 
down must be gradual so that three generations may bring an overall increase with 
respect to today’s numbers by a factor smaller than 23 = 8. But even if the factor 
is 8, today’s level (which Kurzweil argues is the exponentials ‘‘knee’’) corresponds 
to around 12.5 % of the S-curve’s ceiling. 
Figure 16.3 shows an S-curve fit on the data, which has been constrained to 
reach a ceiling by the late 2020s (a conservative constraint). The corresponding 
exponential is also shown as was done in Fig. 16.1. The expected announcement 
by Intel of the Poulson processor in 2012 argues in favor of the S-curve and against 
the exponential trend. 
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Fig. 16.3 Moore’s law with linear scale (above) and logarithmic scale (below). Exponential 
(black line) and S-curve (gray line) begin to diverge in the top graph around the big dotted circle 
(penetration of 11 %) and a moment that could serve as a candidate for the ‘‘knee’’. The black dot 
indicates the expected announcement by Intel of the Poulson processor. Data sources Intel and 
Wikipedia 
 
World Population 
 
 
The evolution of the world population during the 20th century followed an S-curve in 
an exemplary way. Figure 16.4 shows an agreement between data and curve that is 
astonishing if we consider the variety of birth rates and death rates around the world, 
the multitude of stochastic processes that impact the evolution of the world popu- 
lation such as epidemics, catastrophes, wars (twice at world level), important climate 
changes, etc., and on the other hand the simplicity of the curve’s description, namely 
only three parameters (plus a parameter for a pedestal in this case). 
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Fig. 16.4 The evolution of the world population during the last 109 years has followed an 
exemplary S-curve. Data sources United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UN DESA) and U.S. Census Bureau 
 
And yet again, the evolution of the world population has often been likened to 
an explosion following an exponential trend. Where could a ‘‘knee’’ for this 
exponential be positioned? Looking at Fig. 16.4, any ‘‘knee’’ would have to be 
positioned before the 1980s by which time the trend significantly deviated from an 
exponential pattern. 
By some historians the population explosion began in the West, around the 
middle of the 19th century. The number of people in the world had grown from 
about 150 million at the time of Christ to somewhere around 700 million in the 
middle of the 17th century. But then the rate of growth increased dramatically to 
reach 1.2 billion by 1850. In this case the exponential ‘‘knee’’ would have 
occurred when world population reached 8 % of its final ceiling. 
In the above three examples—US Oil Production—, Moore’s law, and World 
Population—we have seen that the ‘‘knee’’ of the exponential curve tends to occur 
at a threshold situated between 7 and 13 % of the ceiling of the corresponding S- 
curve, which translates to a factor of at most 14 between the level of the ‘‘knee’’ 
and the level of the final ceiling. This factor has been estimated rather conser- 
vatively and corroborates the previously mentioned corollary of natural-growth 
studies: infant mortality. 
Such growth potential on any of the variables purported to contribute to a 
singularity by mid 21st century would fall short of becoming alarming. 
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Fig. 16.5 Exponential (thin black line) and logistic (thick gray line) fits on the evolution of the 
real U.S. GDP. This graph can be directly compared with the one on Page 98 from Kurzveil’s The 
Singularity Is Near. Data source U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
There Is Already Some Evidence for Saturation 
 
The U.S. GDP 
 
 
The evolution of the gross domestic product (GDP) in America in constant dollars 
had followed an exponential growth pattern for a while but has deviated from it 
some time ago and now has almost reached the midpoint of an S-curve. Kurzveil 
was too quick to pronounce its evolution as exponential. On logarithmic scale 
Kurzveil’s straight wide band accommodated the gentle curving of the time-series 
data and his criterion of correlation—coefficient r2—was close enough to 1.0. But 
high correlation between two curves does not mean one is a good representation of 
the other. Just think of two straight lines, one almost vertical the other almost 
horizontal; they will be 100 % correlated (correlation coefficient 1.0) and yet one 
will be a very poor representation of the other. A closer examination reveals that a 
logistic function fits better the evolution of the U.S. GDP than an exponential one, 
see Fig. 16.5. And if we judge the fits by their Chi Square (χ2), a more appropriate 
criterion than correlation coefficients, the logistic fit comes out three times better 
than the exponential one (χ 2 of 1112 instead of 3250). Conclusion: the U.S. GDP 
will certainly not contribute to the building up toward a singularity event around 
2045 because from 2013 onward its rate of growth will progressively slow down. 
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The End of the Internet Rush 
 
 
One of the ‘‘explosive’’ variables in Kurzweil book is that of the diffusion of the 
Internet, but the graph on Page 79 of his book shows clear evidence that we are 
dealing with an S-curve developed about half-way to its ceiling. What is being 
witnessed instead is the end of the Internet rush (Modis 2005). In an article 
published in 2005 I demonstrate that the number of Internet users will not grow 
much in the near future. In the US the ceiling of the S-curve has already been 
reached at 72 % of the population, and in the E.U. it should not rise much above 
today’s 67 %. In the rest of the world today’s 18 % will grow to a ceiling of 33 % 
in ten years. 
It would be unreasonable to expect the percentage of the rest of the world to 
remain at this low level forever. The rest of the world includes such countries as 
Japan, Korea, Honk Kong, and Australia where the number of Internet users is 
already practically at maximum. But the rest of the world also includes Africa, 
China, and India, where one can be certain that the number of Internet users will 
eventually grow by a large factor. However, it will be some time before the 
necessary infrastructures are put in place there to permit large-scale Internet 
diffusion. 
For the time being one may infer that the boom we have been witnessing in 
Internet expansion is over. The parts of the world that were ready for it have 
practically filled their niches whereas the parts of the world that were not ready for 
it need much preparatory work (infrastructures, nourishment, education, etc.) and 
will therefore grow slowly. 
The final percentage of Internet users may also reflect cultural differences. 
A percentage of 72 % in the US compared to 67 % in the E.U. might partially 
reflect missing infrastructures in some of the lesser-developed E.U. countries but 
most likely also reflects the different life styles. European society admits less 
change than American society. For example, there are fewer cars per inhabitant in 
Europe, and the Europeans never went to the moon. They will probably end up 
using the Internet somewhat less than the Americans. 
We can make a rough estimate of when a follow-up Internet growth phase 
should be expected. To a first approximation logistics that cascade harmoniously 
show periods of low and high growth of comparable duration (Modis 2007). 
Accordingly, and given that Internet has had a decade of rapid growth, a decade of 
low growth can reasonably be expected before a new S-curve begins. Contrary to 
the image of an explosive uncontrollable growth process we are witnessing 
piecemeal growth with stagnating periods in between that offer fertile ground for 
control and adaptability. 
In the next section we quantify the cascade of S-curves in a natural succession 
and the relationship between their life cycles. 
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Fig. 16.6  A large S-curve decomposed into smaller ones 
 
Fractal Aspects of Natural Growth 
 
 
Sustained growth is not a steady and uniform process. It consists of successive 
S-shaped steps, each of which represents a well-defined amount of growth. A new 
S-curve begins where the previous one left off. Every step is associated with a 
niche that opened following some fundamental change (a mutation, a major 
innovation, a technological break-through, etc.). 
Successive growth stages depicted by cascading logistic curves may outline an 
overall growth process that is itself amenable to a logistic description. Two such 
examples from published work are the discovery of stable chemical elements, 
which spanned three centuries and can be broken down into four rather distinct 
regularly-spaced growth phases (Solla and Derek 1936), and the diffusion of 
Italian railways which came in three waves (Marchetti 1986). 
The graph of Fig. 16.6 has been constructed in a rigorous quantitative way 
(Modis 1994). Notice that the step size and the associated time span (life cycle) of 
the constituent S-curves first progressively increases but then progressively 
decreases going over a maximum step and longest life cycle around the middle of 
the envelope S-curve. Life cycles become longer during the high-growth period 
and shorter during the low-growth periods. 
The phenomenon of shrinking product life cycles, an important concern of 
marketers, can be quantitatively linked to the saturation of the enveloping process. 
Table 16.2 relates the shortening of product life cycles to the level of saturation 
reached. 
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Table 16.2  The relation between the shortening of life cycles and saturation 
 
Life-cycle length (relative to longest) Level of saturation (percent of ceiling) 
0.17 3.1 
0.19 4.0 
0.20 5.2 
0.22 6.9 
0.24 9.1 
0.30 12.8 
0.41 20.0 
0.70 31.4 
1.00 50.0 
0.70 68.6 
0.41 80.0 
0.30 87.2 
0.24 90.9 
0.22 93.1 
0.20 94.8 
0.19 96.0 
0.17 96.9 
 
 
The idea that a growth process can, on closer examination, reveal similar but 
smaller cascading growth processes, suggests a fractal nature for the logistic curve. 
The implication is that further ‘‘zooming-in’’ may reveal an even finer structure of 
logistic cascades. 
The fractal nature of logistics permits one to estimate the level of overall satu- 
ration from observing life cycle trends. This is a powerful approach. Table 16.2, first 
published in Modis 1994, can be used by anyone to determine the position on the 
envelope curve from observations on constituent curves. For example, a non-spe- 
cialist, such as a laborer loading boxes into trucks off the dock of a computer man- 
ufacturer, may notice that the names on the boxes change three times as frequently as 
they used to and deduce that the technology behind these products is about 87 % 
exhausted. This image may be naive, but the approach offers valuable insights for 
those situations in which the tracking of the overall envelope is rather imponderable, 
for example, the evolution of the Windows operating systems. 
 
 
Windows Operating Systems 
 
 
Microsoft has been regularly releasing new operating systems. New software 
developments triggered by hardware improvements make it necessary to introduce 
major changes to the operating systems. This is a typical characteristic of all new 
industries like microchips; they are mutational. But as the industry matures, 
‘‘mutations’’ become rare and life cycles become longer. Figure 16.7 shows the 
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Fig. 16.7  Lifetimes of Windows Operating Systems as defined by the time period to the next 
release. Labels highlight the three longest-lived ones. Data sources Microsoft and Wikipedia 
 
evolution of the life cycle of Microsoft operating system as defined by the time to 
the next launching announcement. 
Windows XP was the operating system with the longest life cycle. Vista’s life 
cycle was 57 % of that of Windows XP and the life cycle of Windows 7 will be 
53 % if Windows 8 comes in 2012. From Table 16.2 we can estimate that the 
Windows technology will be between 68.6 and 80 % exhausted by that time. 
With Windows XP at the center of the envelope S-curve for Windows operating 
systems and the life cycle being symmetric to a first approximation, we can rea- 
sonably expect an end for this growth process by the late 2020s. This coincides 
with our previous estimate for the end of Moore’s law. 
Just as with Internet users, here again we are facing an upcoming lull in the rate 
of growth of such ‘‘explosive’’ processes as microchip and PC operating system 
improvements. This lull should also last about 20 years, duration comparable to 
the duration of the rapid-growth phase of the envelope S-curve. From then (ca 
2030) onward a new sequence of cascading S-curves may slowly enter the scene as 
per Fig. 16.6. But once again, we have a hard time accommodating singular events 
due to ‘‘explosive’’ trends like these by mid 21st century. 
 
 
Society Auto-Regulates Itself 
 
 
There  have  been  many  documented  cases  where  society  has  demonstrated  a 
wisdom and control unsuspected by its members. In this section we will see four 
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such examples portraying society as a super species capable of auto-regulating and 
safeguarding itself from runaway trends. 
 
 
 
Car Accidents 
 
 
Car accidents have received much attention and at times provoked emotional 
reactions. In the 1960s cars had been compared to murder weapons. To better 
understand the mechanisms at play we must look at the history of car accidents. 
We need accurate data and the appropriate indicator. Deaths are better defined and 
recorded than lesser accidents. Moreover, the car as a public menace is a threat to 
society, which may ‘‘feel’’ the pain and try to keep them under control. 
Consequently, the number of deaths per one hundred thousand inhabitants 
per year becomes a better indicator than accidents per mile, or per car, or per 
hour of driving (Marchetti 1983). 
The data shown in Fig. 16.8 are for the United States starting at the beginning 
of the 20th century. What we observe is that deaths caused by car accidents grew 
along an exponential trend that led into an S-curve that reached a ceiling in the mid 
1920s, when deaths reached twenty-four per one hundred thousand per year. From 
then onward car accidents have stabilized even though the number of cars 
continued to grow. A homeostatic mechanism seems to enter into action when this 
limit is reached, resulting in an oscillating pattern around the equilibrium position. 
The peaks may have produced public outcries for safety, while the valleys could 
have contributed to the relaxation of speed limits and safety regulations. What is 
remarkable is that for over sixty years there has been a persistent auto-regulation 
on car safety in spite of tremendous variations in car numbers and performance, 
speed limits, safety technology, driving legislation, and education. 
Why the number of deaths is maintained constant and how society can detect 
excursions away from this level? Is it conceivable that someday car safety will 
improve to the point of reducing the level of automobile accidents to practically 
null the way it was before cars were invented? American society has tolerated this 
level of accidents for the better part of a century. A Rand analyst has described it 
as follows: ‘‘I am sure that there is, in effect, a desirable level of automobile 
accidents—desirable, that is, from a broad point of view, in the sense that it is a 
necessary concomitant of things of greater value to society.’’ (Williams 1958). 
Abolishing cars from the roads would certainly eliminate car accidents, but at the 
same time it would introduce more serious hardship to citizens. 
A homeostatic equilibrium represents a state of well-being. It has its roots in 
nature, which develops ways of maintaining it. Individuals may come forward 
from time to time as advocates of an apparently well-justified cause. What they do 
not suspect  is  that they  may  be acting  as unwitting  agents to deeply rooted 
necessities for maintaining the existing balance, which would have been main- 
tained in any case. An example is Ralph Nader’s crusade for car safety, Unsafe at 
Any Speed, published in the 1960s, by which time the number of fatal car accidents 
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Fig. 16.8 The annual number of deaths from motor vehicle accidents per 100,000 population has 
been fluctuating around 24 since the mid 1920s. The peak in the late 1960s provoked a public 
outcry that resulted in legislation making seat belts mandatory. Data after 1980 show a decline in 
the number of deadly car accidents, but this is due the fact that travelers have been replacing the 
automobile by other means of transportation and in particular the airplane, see discussion in 
Modis 1992, 2002b. Data source Statistical Abstract of the United States 
 
had already demonstrated a forty-year-long period of relative stability. But 
examining Fig. 16.8 more closely, we see that the late 1960s show a relative peak 
in accidents, which must have been what prompted Nader to blow the whistle. Had 
he not done it, someone else would have. Alternatively, a timely social mechanism 
might have produced the same result; for example, an ‘‘accidental’’ discovery of an 
effective new car-safety feature. 
Another such example of society’s ability to auto-regulate and safeguard itself 
is the spreading of AIDS in the United States. 
 
 
 
The AIDS Niche 
 
 
At the time of the writing of my first book Predictions, AIDS was diffusing 
exponentially claiming a progressively bigger share of the total number of deaths 
every year, and forecasts ranged from pessimistic to catastrophic. Alarmists 
worried about the survival of the human species. But finally the AIDS ‘‘niche’’ in 
the U.S. turned out to be far smaller than that feared by most people. In this case 
the variable studied was death victims from AIDS as a percentage of all deaths. 
The S-curve I fitted on the data up to and including 1988 had indicated a growth 
process that would be almost complete by 1994. The ceiling for the disease’s 
growth, projected as 2.3 % of all deaths was projected to be reached in the late 
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Fig. 16.9 Deaths from AIDS in the United States. The ceiling of the S-curve fitted on data up to 
and including 1988 (black dots) is 2.3. Data from years 1989–1998 (open circles) confirm that the 
AIDS niche in the United States was essentially completed by 1995 (Modis 1992 and Modis 
2002b). Data source HIV/AIDS Surveillance, Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Atlanta, GA 
 
1990s, see Fig. 16.9. In other words my conclusion at that time was that a place 
had been reserved for AIDS in American society just above the 2 % level of all 
deaths. 
The little circles in the figure confirm the S-curve trend and the completion of 
this microniche by 1995. By the late 1990s questions were being raised why 
forecasts had overestimated the AIDS threat by so much. 
There seems to have been a mechanism that limited AIDS in a natural way even 
in the absence of adequate medication. As if there were other, more important 
causes of death. This mechanism may have reflected the control exercised by 
American society through subconscious collective concern. The natural-growth 
pattern that the disease followed from its beginning correctly anticipated that 
AIDS would not spread uncontrollably.  Eventually of course  there would be 
effective medication for the disease and the number of victims would decline. 
Those who had predicted imminent doom in the absence of a miracle drug in the 
1980s had failed to take into account the natural competitive mechanisms which 
regulate the split of the overall death rate among the different causes of death, 
safeguarding all along an optimum survival for society. 
After 1995 the number of deaths from AIDS progressively declined in what 
could be described as another natural process—a downward S-curve—reflecting 
the development of progressively effective medication. What Fig. 16.9 spells out 
as shown is society’s ability to safeguard its wellbeing in the absence of effective 
medication and miracle drugs. 
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Fig. 16.10 Data, fits, and projections for the shares of different primary energy sources 
consumed worldwide. For nuclear, the smooth straight line is not a fit but a trajectory suggested 
by analogy. The futuristic source labeled ‘‘Solfus’’ may involve solar energy and thermonuclear 
fusion. The small circles show how things evolved since 1982 when this graph was first put 
together 
 
A more subtle example of society’s ability to auto-regulate and safeguard itself 
is primary-energy substitution and the advent of nuclear energy. 
 
 
 
Nuclear Energy 
 
 
During the last one hundred years, wood, coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy 
have been the main protagonists in supplying the world with energy. More than 
one energy source is present at any time, but the leading role passes from one to 
the other. Other sources of energy (such as hydro, wind, etc.) have been left out 
because they command too small a market share. 
In the early 19th century and before, most of the world’s energy needs were 
satisfied through wood burning and to a lesser extent animal power not considered 
here, see Fig. 16.10. The substitution process shows that the major energy source 
between 1870 and 1950 was coal. Oil became the dominant player from 1940 
onward, as the automobile matured, together with petrochemical and other oil-based 
industries. The vertical scale of Fig. 16.10 is logistic transforming S-curves into 
straight lines. All straight sections in this figure would show up as S-shaped on a 
graph with a linear vertical scale. 
It becomes evident from this picture that a century-long history of an energy 
source can be described quite well—thin smooth lines—with only two constants, 
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those required to define a straight line. (The curved sections are calculated by 
subtracting the straight lines from 100 %.) The destiny of an energy source, then, 
seems to be cast during its early stages of phasing-in, as soon as the two constants 
describing the straight line can be determined. 
A detailed description and the many ramifications of Fig. 16.10 are discussed in 
detail in the literature (Marchetti 1987; Modis 1992, 2009). Here I want to draw 
the reader’s attention to the subtle ways with which society imposes its will. This 
graph was originally put together in 1988 and indicated that natural gas would 
progressively replace oil. Its update twenty years later (little circles) shows that the 
persistent consumption of coal has been at the expense of natural gas. This may not 
only be due to aggressively developing countries such as China who use coal 
ravenously. Developed countries such as the UK and the US have also proven 
reluctant to give up coal. Whoever the culprit, the widening gap between the 
persistent level of coal use and coal’s naturally declining trajectory becomes a 
source of pressure to the system, which is likely to manifest itself through the 
voice of environmentalists. 
Environmentalists in any way have been very vocal in their support of natural 
gas. I wonder, however, what has really been their role in the greening of natural 
gas. The importance of gas in the world market has been growing steadily for the 
last ninety years, independent of latter-day environmental concerns. The voice of 
environmentalists resembles Ralph Nader’s crusade in the 1960s for car safety, 
while the number of deaths from car accidents had already been pinned around 
twenty-four annually per one hundred thousand population for more than forty 
years. 
Environmentalists have also taken a vehement stand on the issue of nuclear 
energy. This primary energy source entered the world market in the mid 1970s 
when it reached more than 1 % share. The rate of growth during the first decade 
seems disproportionately rapid, however, compared to the entry and exit slopes of 
wood, coal, oil and natural gas, all of which conform closely to a more gradual 
rate. At the same time, the opposition to nuclear energy also seems out of pro- 
portion when compared to other environmental issues. As a consequence of the 
intense criticism, nuclear energy growth has slowed considerably, and it is not 
surprising to see the little circles in Fig. 16.10 approach the straight line proposed 
by the model. One may ask what the prime mover here was—the environmental 
concerns that succeeded in slowing the rate of growth or the nuclear-energy craze 
that forced environmentalists to react? 
The coming to life of such a craze is understandable. Nuclear energy made a 
world-shaking appearance in the closing act of World War II by demonstrating the 
human ability to access superhuman powers. I use the word superhuman because 
the bases of nuclear reactions are the mechanisms through which stars generate 
their energy. Humans for the first time possessed the sources of power that feed 
our sun, which was often considered as a god in the past. At the same time 
mankind acquired independence; nuclear is the only energy source that would 
remain indefinitely at our disposal if the sun went out. 
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The worldwide diffusion of nuclear energy during the 1970s followed a rate that 
could be considered excessive, compared to previous energy sources. The market 
share of nuclear energy grew along a trajectory much steeper than the earlier 
natural ones of oil, natural gas, and coal. This abnormally rapid growth—possibly 
responsible for a number of major nuclear accidents—may have been what 
triggered the vehement reaction of environmentalists, who succeeded in 
slowing it down. Appropriately, as the technology matured, the number of 
major nuclear accidents was drastically reduced. However, environmentalists are 
far from having stopped nuclear energy. Ironically, under pressing concerns of 
CO2 pollution, their opposition to nuclear energy had considerably weakened 
until the accident at Fukushima nuclear plant. I believe they will again 
reduce their opposition as public opinion cools off and better safety measures 
are put in place. 
The changeable behavior of environmentalists suggests that there are other 
more fundamental forces at play while environmentalists behave more like pup- 
pets. These forces do not involve governments and their policies that usually 
become shaped after the fact in response to public outcries. 
 
 
 
World Population: The Big Picture 
 
 
Another example of society’s wise and subtle ways of controlling human behavior 
is the slowing down in the rate of growth of the world population during the 20th 
century. The phenomenon has sometimes been erroneously attributed to people 
having become aware of the perils of Earth’s overpopulation and reacted 
accordingly with adequate birth control. But it is only China that has imposed 
nationwide birth controls via legislation and that accounts for only 20 % of the 
world’s population. The main reason the world population has slowed down is that 
rising standards of living offer people more highly preferred things to do than 
having children. The flattening of the S-curve shown earlier in Fig. 16.4 is very 
little a consequence of top-down conscious decision-making. It is mostly a con- 
sequence of subconscious bottom-up forces shaping the patterns of our lives. 
But let us zoom back and consider a much greater historical window. Figure 16.11 
shows world population data since the time of Christ (before that time estimates are 
rather unreliable). A dramatic exponential pattern belongs to an S-curve penetrated 
only to 23 % with an eventual ceiling of 1,750,000,000,000 by year 2700. Obviously 
the uncertainties involved on the level of the ceiling estimated from data that cover 
only the beginning of the S-curve are very large. From a detailed Monte-Carlo study 
on error estimation we obtain up to ± 75 % uncertainty on this number with con- 
fidence level of 90 % (Debecker and Modis 1994). 
The year 2700 is a far-fetched horizon date for making forecasts and such 
statements are more appropriate to fiction than to scientific writing, but can there 
be a grain of truth? At first glance such a conclusion may seem absurd by today’s 
standards and in view of the section World Population above. But is it really 
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Fig. 16.11 The world population since the time of Christ has followed the early part of an S- 
curve, compatible with an exponential. The slowdown during the 20th century is not visible with 
50 year time bins. Data source United Nations Population Division (U.N. 1999) 
 
absurd? Could the S-curve of Fig. 16.4 be followed up by other S-curves in the 
paradigm of the section Fractal Aspects of Natural Growth? 
Altogether possible, claims Cesare Marchetti, who calculated that Earth’s 
carrying capacity is around 1012 people. His is not a forecast but scientific cal- 
culations taking into account availability of resources, energy, housing, and the 
environment (Marchetti 1979). If he is right that there is no fundamental law 
violated by reaching such a number, you can be sure that this will eventually 
happen (no niche in nature that could be filled to completion was ever left 
occupied only partially). But as we saw earlier, people’s subconscious behavior 
during the 20th century assures us that such a thing would take place slowly, 
controllably, and avoiding catastrophe. 
 
 
 
More than Just Cerebral Intelligence 
 
 
This section addresses the claim that intelligent machines will eventually take over 
as a new species—posthumans—reducing humans to the equivalent of monkeys 
for us today. 
Intelligence according to the singularitarians is measured by the speed of 
calculation. I believe that the astronomical numbers of FLOPS (floating-point 
operations per second) forecasted by Kurzweil as the ultimate computing power, 
namely1050 and beyond, will fall short by a large factor, at least 25 orders of 
magnitude, mostly because such computing power will no longer be desired. You 
can get too much of a good thing, for example there is no longer demand for cars 
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to go faster, or for pocket calculators to become thinner/smaller, something that 
would have never crossed the mind of early-car and early-calculator users. 
But assuming unfathomable computing power becomes available, this would 
only be competition to our cerebral intelligence. Humans also possess physical 
intelligence responsible for our reproduction, growth, self-healing, and disease- 
fighting capabilities. Human understanding of the body’s intelligence is to say the 
least inadequate. For example, the enteric part of our autonomic nervous system 
has more memory capability than the spinal cord. A mouse will function brainless 
to an impressive extent. Such phenomena are far from having been thoroughly 
investigated and understood. Where will this knowledge come from? 
In any case there is a catch. If we humans were to provide the superhumans 
with all the knowledge, we would certainly refrain from giving them the power to 
overtake us, or build in mechanisms to prevent such an eventuality. If on the other 
hand, superhumans were to obtain themselves the missing knowledge, then they 
would need to do the studying themselves. But before superhuman machines begin 
dissecting us and putting us under microscopes—as we do with monkeys—they 
will first need physical bodies themselves, which they should be able to fabricate 
and maintain. One cannot argue that advance robotics will produce machines that 
can do that because there is a catch. In order for these robots to be able to move 
around, gather resources, and carry out research to acquire the missing knowledge 
they would first need to have in their system the vey knowledge they set out to 
obtain through studies. 
On the other hand, intellectual power all by itself would not achieve much. 
Besides some evidence for occasional correlation, it is well known that in general 
among the most intelligent people you are not likely to find: the richest, the 
happiest, the most normal (by definition!), the best-adjusted, the most good-nat- 
ured, the most trustworthy, the most creative, the best artists, the most powerful, 
the most popular, or the most famous. In short, fast thinking is not the ultimate 
desirable quality, and thinking faster is not necessarily better in an absolute sense. 
All in all, superhumans enabled to develop thanks to supercomputing power 
would certainly not pose a threat to humans by mid 21st century. In fact, I 
wouldn’t hesitate to extend this reassuring message to the far-fetched horizon date 
of 2,700 that we mentioned earlier. 
 
 
 
What May Happen Instead 
 
 
A central graph early in Kurzweil’s book, which he uses as a platform to launch 
the whole Singularity development, displays a set of data I had painstakingly 
collected earlier for my own publications (Modis 2002a, 2003). The set of data 
basically consists of thirteen independent timelines for the most significant turning 
points—milestones—in the evolution of the Universe. The emerging overall trend 
displays an unambiguous crowding of milestones in recent times. The thinking 
behind my article was that the spacing of the most important milestones could 
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Fig. 16.12 To the extent that milestones of equal importance appear more frequently, the 
respective change they introduce increases. The area of each rectangle represents importance and 
remains constant. The scales of both axes are linear 
 
serve to quantify the evolution of change and complexity and therefore enabling us 
to forecast it. 
It is reasonable to assume that the greater the change associated with a given 
milestone, or the longer the ensuing stasis, the greater the milestone’s importance 
will be. 
 
     Importance = (change introduced) x (duration to the next milestone)          (16.1) 
 
Following each milestone there is change introduced in the system. At the next 
milestone there is a different amount of change introduced. Assuming that mile- 
stones are approximately of equal importance, and according to the above 
definition of importance we can conclude that the change ΔCi introduced by 
milestone i of importance I is 
 
                                       I 
ΔCi =  ——                                                       (16.2)   
                                      Δti 
 
where Δti the time period between milestone i and milestone i + 1 (Fig. 16.12). 
My dataset has a number of weaknesses. Only twelve out of the fifteen time- 
lines used were independent. One timeline had been given to me without dates and 
I introduce them myself; another consisted of my own guesses. Both were heavily 
biased by the other twelve in my disposal. Moreover, some data were simply weak 
by their origin (e.g., an assignment post on the Internet by a biology professor for 
his class). 
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Fig. 16.13 A histogram of all milestones with logarithmic time buckets suggested by clusters of 
milestone dates. The thin black line is superimposed to outline the clusters of milestones that 
define the dates of a canonical milestones set. On the horizontal axis we read the dates of these 
canonical milestones. Present is defined as year 2000. The width of each peak becomes a measure 
of the uncertainty on the date of the canonical milestone (and consequently also the uncertainty 
on the change it brings) 
 
As a matter of fact only one timeline (Sagan’s Cosmic calendar) covers the 
entire range (big bang to 20th century) with dates. A second complete set (by 
Nobel Laureate Boyer) was provided to me without dates. All the other timelines 
coming from various disciplines covered only restricted time windows of the 
overall timeframe, which results in uneven weights for the importance of the 
milestones as each specialist focused on his or her discipline. 
In any case, the grand total of all milestones came to 302 and in a histogram— 
Fig. 16.13—revealed clusters of milestones with peaks that defined a canonical set 
of milestones. Present time was taken as year 2000. Within all sources of uncer- 
tainties mentioned above, I tried to quantitatively study the evolution of com- 
plexity and change in the Universe. 
Figure 16.14 shows that the evolution of change with milestone number has so 
far followed an exponential-growth pattern, which could also be an S-curve 
(logistic) or its life cycle (first derivative) as all three behave exponentially early 
on. Given that the data depict change per milestone I fit to the latter shown by the 
thick gray line. The implication of doing so is that the total amount of change in 
the Universe will be finite by the time the Universe ends. 
The quality of the fit being a little better and the position of the last point both 
argue in favor of the logistic life cycle rather than the corresponding exponential. 
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Fig. 16.14 Exponential and logistic life-cycle fits to the data of the canonical milestone set. The 
vertical axis depicting the amount of change per milestone is linear (graph at the top) and 
logarithm (graph at the bottom). The intermittent vertical line denotes the present. The gray 
circles on the forecasted trends indicate change from future milestones. The change associated 
with the most recent milestone, No 28, will not be known before the appearance of milestone No 
29.  The  error  bars  have  been  calculated  from  the  spread  of  entries  clustered  around  each 
canonical milestone date 
 
 
But these are weak arguments. More serious impact have the forecasts for the 
change expected by future milestones. Table 16.3 lists these forecasts for the next 
five milestones. The logistic fit expects milestones to begin appearing less fre- 
quently in the future whereas the exponential fit expects them at an accelerating 
pace. In particular, the logistic fit has next milestone appearing in 2033 and the one 
after that in 2078. In contrast, the exponential fit has next milestone in 2009 
(remember zero was defined as year 2000 in this study), and the one after that in 
year 2015. By year 2022 the exponential fit forecasts a new milestones every 
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Table 16.3  Forecasts for change as a function of time 
Milestone number Logistic fit Exponential  fit 
Changea Year Changea Year 
29 0.0223 2033 0.1540 2009 
30 0.0146 2078  0.3247 2015 
31 0.0081 2146  0.6846 2018 
32 0.0041 2270  1.4435 2020 
33 0.0020 2515  3.0436 2021 
a    In the same arbitrary units as Fig. 16.14 
6 days and less than a year later infinite change will have taken place!2 This spells 
out ‘‘Singularity’’ and brings it forward by 20 years or so, but the uncertainty of 
this determination could easily be more than 20 years considering the crudeness of 
the method and the enormous timescale involved. 
The logistic life cycle peaks in the mid 1990s. It indicates that we are presently 
traversing the only time in the history of the Universe in which 80 calendar years— 
the lifetime of people born in the 1940s—can witness change in complexity coming 
from as many as three evolutionary milestones. This positions us presently at the 
world’s prime! 
Coincidentally people who will partake in this phenomenon belong to the 
mysterious baby boom that creates a bulge on the world population distribution.3 
As if by some divine artifact a larger-than-usual sample of individuals was meant 
to experience this exceptionally turbulent moment in the evolution of the cosmos. 
The large-scale logistic description of Fig. 16.14 indicates that the evolution of 
change in the Universe has been following a logistic/exponential growth pattern from 
the very beginning, i.e. from the big bang. This is remarkable considering the vast- 
ness of the time scale, and also the fact that change resulted from very different 
evolutionary processes, for example, planetary, biological, social, and technological. 
The fitted logistic curve has its inflection point—the time of the highest rate of 
change—in mid 1990. Considering the symmetry of the logistic-growth pattern, we 
can thus conclude that the end of the Universe is roughly another 15 billion years 
away. Such a conclusion is not really at odds with some scientific thinking that places 
the end of our solar system some 5 billion years from now. 
We have obviously been concerned with an anthropic Universe here because 
we have to a large extend overlooked how change has been recently evolving in 
other parts of the Universe. Still, I believe that such an analysis carries more 
weight than just the elegance and simplicity of its formulation. The celebrated 
physicist John Wheeler has argued that the very validity of the laws of physics 
2 The pattern of a decaying exponential is asymptotic, i.e. it needs infinite time to reach zero, but 
its definite integral between x and ∞ is finite. 
3 It has been often argued that the baby boom was due to soldiers coming back from the fronts of 
WWII. This is wrong because the phenomenon began well before the war and lasted until the 
early 1970 s. The effect of WWII was only a small and narrow wiggly dent in the population’s 
evolution. 
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depends on the existence of consciousness.4 In a way, the human point of view is 
all that counts! It reminds me of a whimsical writing I once saw on a tee shirt: 
‘‘One thing is certain, Man invented God; the rest is debatable’’. 
 
 
 
Epilogue 
 
 
The exponential pattern of milestones in Fig. 16.14, which provides a central 
argument for the Singularity, resembles—and to some extent is affected by—the 
patterns of Moore’s law (Fig. 16.3) and world population (Fig. 16.11). All three 
show many orders of magnitude growth along exponential trends. But Figs. 16.3 
and 16.11 have both avoided the ominously rising trend and have done so in a 
natural way. 
The last two milestones with present defined as year 2000 are: 
 
• 5 years ago: Internet/human genome sequenced 
• 50 years ago: DNA/transistor/nuclear energy. 
 
The next such world-shaking milestone should be expected—even by common 
sense—around 2033 rather than of around 2009 because despite a steady stream of 
significant recent discoveries, there is still no obviously candidate in 2012. That 
was not the case with the last two milestones: the significance of the Internet 
became clear simultaneously with its diffusion, and the significance of nuclear 
energy had become clear long before it was materialized. 
 
 
 
An Afterthought 
 
Playing the Devil’s Advocate 
 
 
Could it be that on a large scale there may be no acceleration at all? Could it be 
that the crowding of milestones in Fig. 16.13 is simply a matter of perception? The 
other day I was told that I should have included Facebook as a milestone. ‘‘It is just 
as important as the Internet,’’ she told me. Would Thomas Edison have thought so? 
Will people one thousand years from now, assuming we will survive, think so? 
Will they know what Facebook was? Will they know what the Internet was? 
It is natural that we are more aware of recent events than events far in the past. 
It is also natural that the farther in the past we search for important events the 
fewer of them will stick out in society’s collective memory. This by itself would 
suffice to explain the exponential pattern of our milestones. It could be that as 
 
 
4 John Wheeler was a renowned American theoretical physicist. One of the later collaborators of 
Albert Einstein, he tried to achieve Einstein’s vision of a unified field theory. 
338 T. Modis  
 
importance fades with the mere distancing from the present it ‘‘gives the 
appearance’’, in John von Neumann’s words, that we are ‘‘approaching some 
essential singularity’’. But this has nothing to do with year 2045, 2025, today, von 
Neumann’s time—the 1950s—or any other time in the past or the future for that 
matter. 
 
 
 
Appendix: The Canonical Milestones 
 
 
The dates generally represent an average of clustered events not all of which are 
mentioned in this table. That is why some events e.g. asteroid collision appears 
dated too recent. Highlighted in bold is the most outstanding event in the cluster. 
Present time is taken as year 2000. 
 
No. Milestone Years ago 
1 Big bang and associated processes 1.55 9 1010 
2 Origin of milky way/first stars 1.0 9 1010 
3 Origin of life on Earth/formation of the solar system and the Earth/oldest 4.0 9 109 
 rocks  
4 First eukaryots/invention of sex (by microorganisms)/atmospheric oxygen/ 2.1 9 109 
 oldest photosynthetic plants/plate tetonics established  
5 First multicellular life (sponges, seaweeds, protozoans) 1.0 9 109 
6 Cambrian explosion/invertebrates/vertebrates/plants colonize land/first trees, 4.3 9 108 
 reptiles, insects, amphibians  
7 First mammals/first birds/first dinosaurs/first use of tools 2.1 9 108 
8 First flowering plants/oldest angiosperm fossil 1.3 9 108 
9 Asteroid collision/first primates/mass extinction (including dinosaurs) 5.5 9 107 
10 First humanoids/first hominids 2.85 9 107 
11 First orangutan/origin of proconsul 1.66 9 107 
12 Chimpanzees and humans diverge/earliest hominid bipedalism 5.1 9 106 
13 First stone tools/first humans/ice age/homo erectus/origin of spoken language 2.2 9 106 
14 Emergence of Homo sapiens 5.55 9 105 
15 Domestication of fire/Homo heidelbergensis 3.25 9 105 
16 Differentiation of human DNA types 2.0 9 105 
17 Emergence of ‘‘modern humans’’/earliest burial of the dead 1.06 9 105 
18 Rock art/protowriting 3.58 9 104 
19 Invention of agriculture 1.92 9 104 
20 Techniques for starting fire/first cities 1.1 9 104 
21 Development of the wheel/writing/archaic empires 4907 
22 Democracy/city states/the Greeks/Buddha 2437 
23 Zero and decimals invented/Rome falls/Moslem conquest 1440 
24 Renaissance (printing press)/discovery of new world/the scientific method 539 
25 Industrial revolution (steam engine)/political revolutions (French, USA) 223 
26 Modern  physics/radio/electricity/automobile/airplane 100 
27 DNA/transistor/nuclear  energy/W.W.II/cold  war/sputnik 50 
28 Internet/human genome sequenced 5 
16   Why the Singularity Cannot Happen 339 
 
 
References 
 
 
Debecker, A., & Modis, T. (1994). Determination of the Uncertainties in S-curve Logistic Fits. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 46, 153–173. 
de Solla Price, & Derek, J. (1936). Little science, big science. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Fisher,  J.  C.,  &  Pry,  R.  H.  (1971).  A  simple  substitution  model  of  technological  change. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 3(1), 75–88. 
Marchetti,  C.  (1979).  On  1012:  A  check  on  earth  carrying  capacity  for  man.  Energy,  4, 
1107–1117. 
Marchetti, C. (1983). The automobile in a systems context: The past 80 years and the next 
20 years. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 23, 3–23. 
Marchetti, C. (1986). Fifty-year pulsation in human affairs: Analysis of some physical indicators. 
Futures, 17(3), 376–388. 
Marchetti, C. (1987). Infrastructures for movement. Technological forecasting and social change, 
32(4), 146–174. 
Modis, T., & Debecker, A. (1992). Chaos like states can be expected before and after logistic 
growth. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 41, 111–120. 
Modis, T. (1992). Predictions: Society’s telltale signature reveals the past and forecasts the 
future. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Modis, T.  (1994).  Fractal  aspects  of  natural  growth. Technological  Forecasting and  Social 
Change, 47, 63–73. 
Modis, T. (2002a). Forecasting the growth of complexity and change. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 69(4), 337–404. 
Modis, T. (2002b). Predictions: 10 years later. Geneva: Growth Dynamics. 
Modis, T. (2003). The limits of complexity and change. The Futurist, 37(3), 26–32. (May-June). 
Modis, T. (2005). The end of the internet rush. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
72(8), 938–943. 
Modis, T. (2007). The normal, the natural, and the harmonic. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 74(3), 391–399. 
Modis, T. (2009). Where has the energy picture gone wrong? World Future Review, 1(3), 12–21. 
(June-July). 
Williams,  J.  D.  (1958).  The  nonsense  about  safe  driving.  Fortune,  LVIII(3),  118–119. 
(September). 
U.N. (1999). Population division department of economic and social affairs. The world at six 
billion. United Nations Secretariat.  
